STATE, NATION AND DIVERSITY in AUSTRALIA

D.L. Jayasuriya

The author is Professor in the Department of Social Work and Social Administration at the University of Western Australia.

Economic and demographic changes have put extreme pressure on Australian multiculturalism. The state-sponsored ethnic identity model of multiculturalism served its purpose well through the 1970s and 1980s. But the challenge for the 1990s is to develop a new multiculturalism which will bring ethnic minority groups from the private to the public domain. The philosophy and ideology of citizenship and political participation provide a powerful base for revamping multiculturalism. This article presents a case for such a process, but first it traces the development of Australian attitudes and policies on immigration and culture.

Australian attitudes to immigration and inter-group relations are dominated by the ethos of an 'anglo fragment' society. By this it is meant that Australian society, throughout waves of immigration, has been dominated by beliefs and political attitudes deriving from the parent country and manifest in the early British colonial settlers. Anglo influences have helped to delineate the context within which settler-indigenous and host society-newcomer relations have been fashioned. This cultural and structural hegemony has, despite minor setbacks, continued over time and become firmly ingrained in the fabric of Australian society. Questions of state, nation and diversity have to be understood and examined within this historical, socio-political context.

Nation and society in the 19th century

The pattern and code of racial and ethnic relations determined in the early years of colonial Australia heavily influenced the philosophy of settlement which prevailed until the experiment with multiculturalism in the 1970s. Australia was established as a colony of white European settlers of British ancestry. It was a 'segmented' society, i.e. one composed of mutually exclusive social groups, whites and non-whites.[1] Up to about 1850, landed gentry of mostly Protestant origin constituted the dominant migrant groups and prescribed the criteria of 'inclusion' and 'exclusion' for other groups such as the Irish Catholics, Aborigines and Asian settlers. The norms which were established stressed the imperative of anglicisation or 'anglo-conformity', in particular, the strong need to preserve and maintain a racially and culturally homogeneous monocultural society. In this model of assimilation the dominance of the English language played an important role as an 'unproblematic medium of communication'.[2] This has remained the most secure and non-controversial aspect of Australian policy in this area.

The centrality of immigration and settlement philosophy in the fashioning and evolution of Australian nationalism was first evident in the 1850s in the policy towards the importation of indentured labour to work the cane fields of Queensland and the gold mines in Victoria and New South Wales. The racism of this formative period of Australian history culminated in the enactment of racial exclusion legislation (the *Immigration Act of 1901*) when Australia became a federation in 1901. It is no mere coincidence that the first and most notable enactment of the newly established Commonwealth of Australia was a forcible manifestation of the growing sense of Australian nationalism. Henceforth, what was generally known as the White Australia policy became the symbol of Australian nationalism and imperial sentiment. The requirement of racial homogeneity and monoculturalism was considered to be a necessary condition of nation building.

Post-1945: from assimilationism to multiculturalism

In her authoritative study defending the White Australia policy, Mary Willard argued that a fundamental reason for this exclusionist policy was the 'preservation of British Australian nationality'.[3] This vividly demonstrates the extent to which race and colour are historically linked with a sense of Australian national identity. Race and nation became indistinguishable in that they overlapped in determining the criteria of membership of the emergent nation state. No wonder then that Benjamin Akzin, writing in 1964, described Australia as 'an almost completely formed nation state with no irredentas or internal ethnic frictions to raise its ethnic as distinct from its political identity to the level of consciousness'.[4] Akzin wished for Australia that 'neither external nor internal complications may arise to disturb it from this ideal condition'. But, 25 years on, this is not the case.

The orthodoxy linking the nation-state with ethnic homogeneity has been challenged by the profound social and political changes in Australian society over the last four decades and is entirely due to the mass migration of the post-World War II period. As in most other parts of the world, the return of 'an unmixed nation' remains a dream. Mass migration in the 1950s and 1960s was guided by the prevailing ideology of monocultural assimilationism. But reflecting the sense of liberalism and pragmatism characteristic of Australian public life, the official attitudes towards migrant settlement were relaxed and modified. It was believed that the social and cultural diversity that was becoming so apparent and visible in Australian society could be accommodated within the existing institutional framework.

However, the experience of the new groups of settlers, drawn mainly from Eastern and Southern European countries, was discordant with the thinking and discourse of the dominant group in Australia, and anglo-assimilationism required modification. These modifications – the softer versions of assimilationism – were abruptly and somewhat dramatically swept aside after the Labor Party was elected federally in 1972, after 23 years in opposition. The new reformist government gave high priority to immigration policy reform, in particular, the abrogation of the *Immigration Act of 1901* and the introduction of a non-discriminatory policy of migrant recruitment. Concurrently, the orthodoxy of assimilationist thinking in settlement philosophy was discarded in favour of a new policy of multiculturalism or cultural pluralism.

The term 'multicultural', which was borrowed from Canada, describes a situation where 'variant cultures can flourish peacefully side by side' provided there is an acceptance of the commonalities of society embodied in the political and legal system.[5] Multiculturalism is legitimated, as a state-sponsored ideology, by common acceptance of the prevailing social order. By imposing limits on the degree of acceptable differences, a paradox is created. Pluralism cannot flourish without some degree of structural differentiation. The tension created by competition between the new structures and mainstream institutions (e.g. in the areas of the media, education, sport and religion) remains a critical and unresolved issue politically and legally.[6]

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From the outset, multiculturalism sought to represent the demographic diversity and social differentiation evident in Australian society in the key notions of 'ethnic groups' and 'ethnicity'.[7] Thus, *ethnicity* and its cognate notion of *identity* became central elements in the language of public discourse relating to multiculturalism. And, ethnicity as socially constructed by the definers of public policy, became a key notion in matters of public policy as well as in diverse aspects of social interaction.[8]

The legacy of cultural pluralism

The 'culturalist' approach to multiculturalism is most evident in initiatives in the media and communications. The policy gave pride of place to language and became the core of the ethnic/identity model of multiculturalism that evolved in Australia, and continues to prevail. Thus multi*cultural* education was equated with multi*lingual* education and the provision of ethnic TV and radio was given high priority.[9] Nowhere was this policy orientation more apparent than in the Galbally Report which laid the institutional foundations for promoting and legitimising this version of culturalist multiculturalism.[10] Despite cosmetic changes, it is this model which continues to survive, though it is increasingly under strain and scrutiny.

Cultural multiculturalism was not simply a form of 'identity politics'.[11] In the United States and elsewhere, it was a manifestation of the liberal-individualist response to the ethnic revival of the 1960s. Australian multiculturalism, being decidedly individualistic, fitted well with the philosophy of individualism, voluntarism and self-help characteristic of the Fraser government (1975-1982). A key component of liberalism – that each individual's 'good' is as valid as any other individual's – was simply extended to individuals as members of collective entities such as ethnic groups. Therefore, it was argued that liberalism was consistent with the pursuit of different 'goods' by a variety of groups. As in the United States, the accommodation afforded ethnic minorities through cultural pluralism was within a framework of conventional liberalism.[12]

Policy makers interpreted the problems of migrants – their structural disadvantages and inequalities – as individual problems, largely in terms of cultural factors such as language deficits. As a result, migrant problems were perceived as those relating to cultural and communication difficulties, and the remedial strategies devised included multiculturalist social policies such as those dealing with language and media. By identifying ethnic minority groups as essentially cultural, the potential for so-

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cial conflict and disharmony was avoided. As well, the strategy focussed on the private rather than the public domain. An emphasis on the latter perspective would focus on these groups as actors in the political process with the right to make claims on the state. The stress on the private domain had the desired effect of de-politicising ethnicity.[13]

Despite the attraction of cultural pluralism as a means of generating greater tolerance and acceptance of 'difference', the difficulties inherent in the approach were well recognised by policy-makers.[14] These were of two sorts. First there was that surrounding the characterisation of the notions of culture, ethnicity and identity and, in particular, the problem of polarisation around the *expressive* and *instrumental* dimensions of ethnicity. The *expressive* dimension emphasises the subjective and affective aspects of ethnic group membership rather than the material aspects. The *instrumental* dimension emphasises the struggle for scarce resources, involving competition, conflict and power relations between groups. The second difficulty concerns the degree of differentiation (in schools, sporting clubs, churches and voluntary ethnic associations, etc.) that is permissible without damaging social cohesion or the integrity and moral order of society.[15]

The contradictions and tensions inherent in cultural pluralism stem from the problems of ethnicity and identity, and debate about immigration makes it abundantly clear that the fate of multiculturalism will depend on how we respond to these two issues.

There is no doubt that the ethnic identity model of multiculturalism promoted by the state, has proved eminently functional for newcomers as well as for the dominant groups. For the former, it was a useful first generation strategy which facilitated adaptation by providing much needed social support, self-respect and dignity for the culturally different.[16] But, as left-oriented critics of the ideology and practice of multiculturalism have observed, the model was also a strategy for incorporation of ethnic groups into the dominant culture.[17] Restricting the strivings of these groups to the private rather than the public domain, proved an effective means of regulating and controlling minority groups.

New expressions of racism

The conservative critics from the right, while applauding the increased tolerance and egalitarianism associated with multiculturalism, are nevertheless lukewarm, if not antagonistic, towards continued multiculturalism.[18] Their objections are mainly on the grounds that multiculturalism, by institutionalising differences and reifying ethnic group membership, promotes conflict and divisiveness; in short, the fear is that this threatens social cohesion and endangers national unity.

A disquieting feature of this conservative backlash against multiculturalism is the emergence of a new ideology of racism. 'Old' racism was based on discrimination on biological grounds and on racial superiority. The new ideology of racism expresses itself in a language and terminology sharply different from that of 'old' racism.[19] Central to the new racism is the concept of a 'nation' rather that of culture; racism and nationalism are inextricably interwoven in this new language. The use of the concept of the nation as a basis for demarcating the boundaries of group membership is exemplified in the recently expressed conservative ideology of *One Australia*. This reflects in quieter tones the sentiments of strident nationalism, and seeks to provide a moral justification for the exclusion of those identified as not belonging to the nation. Nationalism is no longer a matter of racial superiority, but one of cultural uniqueness.

New racism distinguishes between 'insiders' and 'outsiders', 'in-groups' and 'out-groups', on a variety of grounds

1. Donald G. Barker, 'Australian and Anglo-Racism', in F.S. Stevens (ed.), *Racism: the Australian Experience*, Vol.1, Taplinger, New York, 1972.
2. As Taylor has noted in the Canadian context. C. Taylor, 'Alternative Futures', in A. Cairns & C. Williams (eds), *Constitutionalism, Citizenship and Society in Canada*, University of Toronto Press, 1985.
3. M. Willard, *History of the White Australia Policy to 1920*, Melbourne University Press, 1967.
4. Benjamin Akzin, *State and Nation*, Hutchinson, 1964, p. 102.
5. C. Wirth, 'The Problem of Minority Groups', in R. Linton (ed.), *The Science of Man in World Crisis*, Columbia Press, 1945. Unlike Canadian multiculturalism, which some writers see as a move towards 'corporate pluralism' because of the formal recognition given to 'groups' as racial and ethnic collectivities, Australian multiculturalism was decidedly 'individualistic' as these groups were not given any formal standing in the national policy. See W. Lambert & D. Taylor (eds), *Coping with Cultural and Racial Diversity in Urban America*, Praegar, NY, 1990.
6. D.L. Jayasuriya, 'Whither Multiculturalism?' *10th Annual Lalor Address*, Human Rights Commission, Canberra, 1984.
7. M. de Lepervanche, 'Immigration and Ethnic Groups'. in S. Encel & L. Bryson (eds), *Australian Society* (4th ed.), Sydney: Longmans, Sydney, 1984; G. Bottomley, 'Ethnicity, Race and Nationalism in Australia', *Australian Journal of Social Issues*, 23 (3), 1988; A. Jakubowicz, 'State and Ethnicity: Multiculturalism as an Ideology', *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology*, 17 (3), 1981.
8. See S. Castles *et al*, *Mistaken Identity*, Pluto Press, Sydney, 1988.
9. See National Advisory and Co-ordinating Committee on Multicultural Education (NACCME), *Education In and For a Multicultural Society: Issues and Strategies for Policy Making*, Department of Education, Canberra, 1987.
10. Department of Labour and Immigration, *Report on the Review of Post-Arrival Programs and Services for Migrants* (the Galbally Report), AGPS, Canberra, 1978.
11. J. Rex & S. Tomlinson, *Coloured Immigrants in a British City*, Oxford UP, London, 1967.
12. W. Kymlicka, *Liberalism, Community and Culture*, Oxford University Press, 1989.
13. See M. Walzer, 'Pluralism in Political Perspective', in *The Politics of Ethnicity*, Harcourt, 1980.
14. See, for example, Department of Labour and Immigration, *Interim and Final Report of Committee on Community Relations* (the Lippman Report), AGPS, Canberra, 1978.
15. J. Martin, *The Migrant Presence*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1978; B.M. Bullivant, 'Australia's Pluralist Dilemma', *Australian Quarterly*, 55 (2), 1983; S. Encel, *The Concept of Ethnicity and its Application to Australian Society*, Aust. Inst. of Multicultural Affairs, Melbourne, 1986.
16. D.L. Jayasuriya, *op cit.*
17. A. Jakubowicz, *op.cit.*; J. Collins, *Migrant Hands in Distant Lands*, Pluto Press, Sydney, 1988; S. Castles *et al*, *Mistaken Identity*, Pluto Press, Sydney, 1988.
18. For example, J. Hirst, 'Australia's Absurd History: a Critique of Multiculturalism', *Overland* 117, 1990, sanctifies Australia as a place 'expert in the modes of toleration'. Sadly, this ignores and distorts both the Aboriginal and immigrant experience of neglect, exploitation, and discrimination. See also L. Foster & D. Stockley, *Australian Multiculturalism: a Documentary History and Critique*, Multilingual Matters, Clevedon, 1988.
19. For an extended discussion of the shift from old to new racism, see D.L. Jayasuriya, 'Racism and Immigration in Australia: from Old to New', in *Proceedings of the Australasian Society for Human Biology*, Nº 4, Centre for Human Biology, University of Western Australia, 1991.

such as those of social acceptability and desirable cultural characteristics. Difference is not constructed in racial or biological terms, but in terms of group norms and attitudes. It is the way in which the 'other' is constituted that distinguishes the old racism from the new.

The plea for social harmony, increasingly voiced by critics of multiculturalism, such as Blainey, Ruxton and others, is in effect a means of affirming traditional values about the nation state as expressed by the dominant groups. It is equally an expression of the need for aliens and newcomers to conform to the values, ethos and social norms of the 'nation'. Viewed in these terms, antagonism against 'Asians' derives largely from perceptions that they are acting contrary to Australian values and norms such as egalitarianism, for example, in that they work too hard and seek rapid advancement. The racist argument is now stated primarily, though not exclusively, in terms of 'social cohesion' and 'national unity', and becomes linked with xenophobic nationalism. As Parekh has noted, in almost all European countries – and Australia is no exception – 'racism' has entered a new phase. It has taken:

> *the form of a plea for the identity and respect for the rights of the majority [where] ethnic minorities are no longer viewed as being inferior; rather that their presence poses a threat to the cultural integrity of the indigenous community.*[20]

The new racism seeks to exploit to its own advantage, the liberal attitude towards cultural difference espoused by multiculturalism, by exaggerating the intrinsic worth of these differences.

But more central to this new ideology is the concept of the 'imagined community'.[21] The nation, as the 'imagined community', characterised by group norms, group attitudes and the core values of the dominant groups, becomes the means of demarcating the boundaries of acceptance and rejection of group membership and of defining the bases for inclusion and exclusion. Indeed, as Hobsbawm puts it, 'nationalism comes before nations'; it is particularly appealing to the petit-bourgeosie and is seen as 'a vested interest of the less examination passing classes'.[22] Today cultural hegemony has come to mean *Australian* and not *British*. One version of Australian nationalism, manifest in a range of cultural and social forms, has come to mean a process through which the nation is defined by implicitly excluding groups that do not conform to the dominant sets of norms which are said to constitute the 'nation'. This is the very denial of pluralism, and of the reality of the immigrant experience. This conflation of *race*, *nation* and *culture* is, in short, central to the crisis of Australian multiculturalism. In this context Stockley rightly comments on the possibility that Australian studies courses, which were promoted in the 1980s as an educational ideal, could reverse the growth of pluralism reflected in multicultural education policies.[23] As with most kinds of nationalism, the 'Australian studies' type of development has the potential to lead to a narrow xenophobic Australian nationalism reaffirming the cultural hegemony of the dominant groups.

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Australian multiculturalism evolved in a relatively controlled and moderate manner but without gaining much public legitimacy. Generally it has taken the form of the pursuit of a social ideal and therefore has been perceived as relatively unthreatening. But a changing social reality has placed a heavy strain on the utility and relevance of the multiculturalism of the 1970s and 1980s. Two features dominate this emerging reality: one is the problems associated with economic growth and restructuring, especially in a climate of severe recession and mounting unemployment; and the other is the changing social demography, particularly the new waves of Asian migrants, and the growing presence of second and third generations of ethnic origin. The current controversy about immigration and multiculturalism raises questions about the ability of the cultural pluralism paradigm to respond meaningfully to this new reality.

Towards democratic pluralism: the challenge of the 1990s

In reconceptualising Australian multiculturalism, four key themes need to be underscored.[24] First is the stark reality of a pluralistic community. As Jean Martin observed, the existence of concentrations of particular ethnic groups in the urban ecology and in certain occupations is evidence of the growth of a 'genuinely pluralist society'.[25] Contemporary Australia exhibits two features which, among other considerations, highlight the complex nature of this pluralism. One is the presence in significant numbers of migrants of Asian and/or non-Caucasian origin; the other is the blurring of ethnic group boundaries due to the increasing incidence of inter-ethnic marriage among second and third generations. As a result, ethnic boundaries have become more fluid and permeable, and the earlier expressive sense of ethnicity has given way to a symbolic and instrumental ethnicity where ethnic groups are seen more clearly as *minority groups*. This pluralism in society, implying an acceptance of difference which is racial and ethnic, cannot be sustained without some degree of visible and formal representation in the institutions of civil and political society (e.g. by accepting the right to representation of these groups on various bodies, and by provision of a greater degree of access to power structures).

However defined, ethnic groups, as relatively permanent collectivities, are now established minority interest groups, which compete with others in the public domain to satisfy their material needs and aspirations. Hence, the challenge of the 1990s must be to accommodate the genuine political aspirations of these groups in the public domain through appropriate political and institutional changes such as the legislative safeguard of minority rights. What is evolving is a model of interest group politics based on 'ethnicity' operating in the public domain. In policy terms, this means the recognition of ethnic minority groups as political actors with legitimate interests and a stake in the political process. As political actors, these groups are interested in more than the symbolic aspects of ethnicity.

The second key theme is that, after nearly a decade and a half of multi-

culturalist social policies, issues of equality and social rights have become more acute in a period of economic downturn. This is compounded by the changing social reality, especially the presence of new waves of predominantly non-Caucasian and Asian migrants. There is mounting evidence that the adverse social effects of structural adjustment of the economy (such as restricted access to housing, declining standards of health, and high levels of youth unemployment) are more pronounced in some ethnic groups. The economic and social well-being of these groups has become a critical public policy issue. The orthodox multiculturalism of documents such as the Jupp Report[26] and the National Agenda[27] has a declining relevance for affected groups because their position has been made critical by public sector abrogation (increased privatisation of welfare by the market or reliance on kin networks) and cut-backs of migrant welfare programs such as for ESL, community grants, and grant-in-aid workers. The multiculturalism of the future will have to address more directly the rights and entitlements of these minority groups who are clearly a markedly differentiated segment of society.[28] Accepting difference implies that policies need to be designed and delivered in a way that takes into account this difference.

Third, a new model of multiculturalism, apart from responding to the inherent limitations of culturalist multiculturalism, will need to adjust to the emerging instrumental needs and aspirations of minority groups (e.g. equality and justice for refugees, and the demands of new waves of Asian migrants, ethnic women and youth) and to the fact that multiculturalism has integrative potential. Increasingly, pluralism requires the statement of a set of commonly accepted principles against which it is possible to evaluate the claims of interests groups in a democratic society. Following the work of the English social theorist, Raymond Plant[29] and others, it is suggested that there is a need for a benchmark defining the general good which might serve as a reference point for interest groups.

The philosophy and ideology of citizenship may provide that reference point. Citizenship, embodying as it does 'a set of needs, rights, resources and opportunities which individuals must have [in order] to pursue any goals at all',[30] is an attractive and powerful basis for reformulating multiculturalism in a democratic and pluralistic society. The purpose of the envisaged reforms is the achievement of equality and social justice, and the attachment to a process of integrative nation-building. This conceptualisation takes us away from 'identity politics' and a narrow cultural pluralism towards a more democratic form of pluralism built around minority rights and enhanced social participation. Such a view of citizenship goes beyond a liberal individualist model based on civil and political rights, and narrowly conceived of as 'universal citizenship'.[31] Citizenship implies not only that individuals are a part of a community, but also that within this community differences are explicitly recognised.

Fourth, in this pluralistic view of citizenship, *participation* is a key element. It is participation which enhances the status of citizenship and enables one to exercise one's rights. As Marshall, in his classic statement on the idea of citizenship, correctly observed:

> *citizenship rights are essentially concerned with the notion of social participation of persons within the community as fully recognized legal members.*[32]

According to Marshall, the exercise of power derived from political citizenship is essential to achieving other rights, in particular, economic security and social well-being. For this reason, much of the discussion about participation has centred around the achievement of political participation.[33] But multiculturalism, which has been seen in some quarters as a precondition for increased participation in citizenship, has instead encouraged a form of identity politics. What is needed for a more democratic form of pluralism is to achieve maximum degree of political participation, and a *guarantee* of what Parsons terms the 'rights enabling participation in citizenship'.[34]

Citizenship as a normative concept, referring to full and equal community participation, is perhaps the most valuable dimension for a revamped form of multiculturalism. Thus for, Dahrendorf:

> *citizenship is not mainly about where people stand, but about what they do. It is about participating.*[35]

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20. Parekh, 'New Racism: the British Example' in New Expressions of Racism, *SIM Special* Nº 7, International Alert, London, 1987, p. 99.
21. In the sense it is used by Benedict Anderson in *Marginal Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (3rd ed.), London, 1986.
22. E. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism in 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge University Press, 1990.
23. D. Stockley, 'Australian Studies and Multiculturalism', in *Proceedings of Conference on Ethnicity and Multiculturalism*, Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs, Melbourne, 1986.
24. For and elaboration of these themes and a discussion of multiculturalism and citizenship see L. Jayasuriya, 'Citizenship, Democratic Pluralism and Ethnic Minorities in Australia', in R. Nile (ed.), *Immigration, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Ethnicity and Race in Australia and Britain*, Centre for Australian Studies, University of London, 1991.
25. J. Martin, *op.cit.*, p. 98.
26. Department of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (DILGEA), *Don't Settle for Less: Review of Migrant and Multicultural Programs and Services* (the Jupp Report), AGPS, Canberra, 1986.
27. Office of Multicultural Affairs (OMA), *Towards a National Agenda for Multiculturalism: Discussion Paper*, AGPS, Canberra, 1989.
28. For a critique of Australian policy documents which attempt to address issues of equality and rights, see L. Jayasuriya, 'Ethnic Minorities and Social Justice in Australian Society', *Australian Journal of Social Issues*, 22 (3), 1987.
29. R. Plant, 'Citizenship, Rights and Socialism', *Fabian Society Tract* Nº 531, Fabian Society, London, 1988.
30. *ibid.*, p. 3.
31. See Anne Phillips in G. Andrews (ed.), *Citizenship*, Lawrence & Wishart, 1991. Phillips identifies three distinct meanings of 'universal citizenship': citizenship for everyone, universal and common, and guaranteeing equal treatment. She challenges the latter and argues that 'when a society is socially differential, then citizenship must be equally so' (p. 83).
32. As pointed out by B.S. Turner, *Citizenship and Capitalism*, Allen & Unwin, 1988, p. 134.
33. J. Jupp, *The Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities in Australia*, Centre for Multicultural Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, 1989.
34. T. Parsons, 'Full Citizenship for the Negro American', *Daedalus* 94 (4), 1965.
35. R. Dahrendorf, *The New Liberty* (The Reith Lectures) Routledge Kegan Paul, London, 1975, p. 440.

Likewise, Held maintains that the post-Marshallian debate about citizenship is one that invites:

> *the struggle for membership and participation in the community ... for different groups, classes and movements [who] struggle to gain degrees of autonomy and control over their lives in the face of various forms of stratification, hierarchy, and political oppression.*[36]

Furthermore, by allowing minority groups to participate fully and exercise their rights in the broad public domain, citizenship facilitates social integration by encouraging a 'civic religion'. By strengthening the bond of citizenship located in a common material culture, individuals are cemented into a sociocultural whole. It is by enhancing the conditions of effective citizenship that one can achieve social integration and facilitate the processes of nation building through a shared sense of a common destiny.

Therefore, it is a prime task of policy makers to clearly articulate the goals and social purposes of citizenship and to create a new charter of multiculturalism based on democratic pluralism. Such a charter would go beyond the 'identity politics' of the past and the simple model of cultural pluralism, and would imply that:

> *new groups in society could be expected to pursue their cultural interests safely without recognising the need for them to participate effectively in the public arena and thereby enabling them to challenge existing social and political interests.*[37]

A prime object of democratic pluralism, as Colin Mercer aptly interprets this new direction, would be to move from:

> *the defensive enclave logic of cultural maintenance to a much more active sense of empowerment of minority groups in the public sphere.*[38]

For this to occur, the language of public discourse will need to change from that of 'identity politics' (the private domain) to 'minority rights' (the public domain).

Additionally, there is a need to reconceptualise the public-private distinction, so central to liberal theorising. In much the same way as some liberal theorists have sought to confine women to the private (domestic) sphere, liberal orthodoxy, by involving the idea of 'benign neutrality', has sought to depoliticise ethnicity and confine it to the 'private' realm (the song and dance variety of ethnic identity). It is no longer possible to relegate either ethnicity or gender rites to the private realm without having an impact on the public domain. These aspects of social functioning relate to 'public ideals of equal rights and resources'.[39]

Instead of a nation-state based on a culturally defined community, what we are likely to see is the emergence of a nation-state as an essentially *political* concept. The political/cultural differentiation harks back to Meinecke's classic distinction between a 'cultural nation' and a 'political nation'.[40] In the former, the emphasis is on the 'spirit of the community' founded on such characteristics as common heritage and language, distinct area of origin and settlement, religious customs and history. These, incidentally, are often the defining characteristics of 'ethnicity'. But the concept of a political nation offers a more objective concept: one where the state and nation are synonymous in the sense that the nation is 'a community of politically aware citizens equal before the law irrespective of their social and economic status, ethnic origin and religious beliefs'.[41] To quote Waltzer:

> *politics must create the (natural) unit it was once thought merely to mirror ... and it must create unity without denying or repressing multiplicity.*[42]

Here, nationalism and nation-building, within the liberal-rationalist paradigm, goes hand in hand with liberty, reason and progress; and to remain a force must gain its substance and meaning from the processes of state formation.

Pluralism needs to informed and infused by the tenets and philosophy of a democratic citizenship in order to strengthen social bonds and identifications. To achieve these ends, the social and political landscape will need to incorporate a range of new and different social forms, images and styles of conduct. In such a context, there will be new social identifications and political legitimacy with a focus on the politics of state formation. Clearly, as Mouffe rightly notes, as Australia moves towards 100 years of Federation 'only a pluralistic conception of citizenship can take account of the current proliferation of new political aspirations ... and accommodate the specificity and multiplicity of democratic demands'.[43]

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36. D. Held, *Political Theory and the Modern State*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1989, p. 199.
37. L. Jayasuriya, *Language and Culture in Australian Public Policy: Some Critical Reflections*, Occasional Paper (new series), Department of Social Work and Social Administration, University of Western Australia, 1988, p. 24.
38. Colin Mercer, 'Language, Politics and Policies', *Culture and Policy*, 1 (1), 1989.
39. See W. Kymlicka, *Contemporary Political Philosophy*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, for a useful and succinct discussion of the public-private distinction in liberal theorising. Referring to feminist theory, Kymlicka argues that the domestic-public split has been confounded with a more conventional state-society meaning associated with the public-private distinction in liberal political thought.
40. Peter Alter, *Nationalism*, Edward Arnold, 1985, quotes the German historian Fredrich Meinecke as making 'one of the most famous contributions to enquiries into the nation' (p. 12) by making this illuminating distinction between *cultural* and *political* nation. This, Alter notes, is closely related to Hans Kohn's *subjective* and *objective* concepts of nations.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 15ff.
42. M. Walzer, *op.cit.*, p. 12.
43. C. Mouffe, 'The Civic Lesson', *New Statesman and Society*, 7, Oct 1988, p. 37.

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